This paper addresses some important concepts related to contemporary design. First, it recognizes that failure-proof design is not always possible, as witnessed by recent disastrous failures. Then it discusses contemporary decision making. It introduces the necessity for system design and defines a coastal system consisting of PhysicoEnvironmental Subsystems (PES), supported by a Socio-Economic Subsystem (SES). It discusses failure and the necessity to design resilience throughout the system to deal with such failure. It also describes the different design requirements resulting from the expectations of the individuals and the collective (government) within the system. Finally, it presents an example, outlining the options available for a resilient re-design of New Orleans.
INTRODUCTION
Resilience is currently a popular topic that is poorly understood and often defined incorrectly. This paper is a journey to discover the meaning of failure and resilience. We first discuss contemporary design and decision making to understand the technical and social contexts for coastal design. Then we search for the meanings of some contemporary concepts such as failure, risk, mitigation and adaptation. The implications of minimum cost calculations are analyzed and this is followed by a discussion of some common causes of failure. Finally we examine how to introduce resilience into the coastal system and present an example to demonstrate the complexities involved in designing a resilient coastal system.
CONTEMPORARY DESIGN
Traditionally, "design" was considered design of structures or improvements.
Such design was normally based on maximizing the Benefit/Cost ratio (BCR), but this paradigm is no longer valid. We must also minimize Environmental Impact (EI). Thus instead of simply designing structures, we must now design Physico-Environmental Systems (PES), where PES denotes (structures within their environment, or structures plus their environmental interaction). In such PES design, BCR and EI are equally important, because a poor BCR will be rejected by the proponents of the project, while high EI will be rejected by the regulators (government) and the public (individuals, stakeholders).
Designing a PES instead of simply designing structures has been a paradigm shift in design philosophy. A second major shift in design, discussed in this paper, will now be to incorporate resilience into the PES.
For any contemporary project to be successful, the designed PES must have public support and the approval of the stakeholders and regulators. If we define the Socio-Economic System (SES) as the combination of the public, individual stakeholders, government and the economy, then the system to be addressed in contemporary coastal design is the combination of two subsystems, the PES and SES. But a special relationship must exist between PES and SES; the SES must support the PES, as shown in 
CONTEMPORARY DECISION MAKING
In jurisdictions where the public has a political voice, the tool to gain SES support for the PES is the contemporary decision making process shown in Fig.  2 . This process is based on the principles of democracy; the public is involved in the decision making. The rules of the process are usually unstated, leaving their interpretation up to the individual participants. Thus, for example, some participants may think they have a privileged position, because they put up the money or create jobs, or because they represent appropriate use of the environment, or because their livelihood, enjoyment or use of the area is impacted by the project. Such attitudes result in acrimony, confusion, misunderstanding, unnecessary project delays and unwanted court challenges.
The rules for the contemporary decision making process are really quite straightforward and should be understood by everyone before the process begins. They are: − All participants have a right to be heard, The understanding of resilience involves clear definitions of both the concepts of failure and of resilience. These discussions are found in next section. The introduction of resilience involves trade offs with respect to economy and safety. For that reason discussions on resilience, its definition for the particular project and its requirements and opportunities must be the first step in the design process and since the introduction of resilience impacts both PES and SES, discussions of failure and resilience must involve the representatives of the SES. Thus, the SES must be involved from the very beginning of the design process as shown in Fig. 2 .
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To prepare for the start of the design/consultation process of Fig. 2 , the designers need to identify clearly where the project is going and where it will end up. This phase is called pre-design in this paper. It is essential that it be quite separate from the actual design. It must not contain any detailed design so that the stakeholders do not feel that the project has been pre-digested before they arrive and think that their input will have little effect on the eventual project outcome.
The process regularly frustrates the parties involved and often results in delays, postponement or court challenges. The alternative, however, is the traditional process where decisions are made from a position of power. Both processes are shown to have shortcomings in Kamphuis (2005 Kamphuis ( , 2006 . One aim of this paper is to point to some possible ways to succeed with the contemporary decision making process, because it represents the rules by which we must play for many projects in many jurisdictions. It is noted here that court challenges normally revolve around procedure; if the correct procedures are followed (the three simple rules above), the courts will very likely agree with the decisions.
Failure
Traditionally structures have been designed in a narrow (probabilistic) way, using the limit state equation which in its simplest form is:
where P F is probability of failure, P is cumulative probability, R is resistance (strength) and S is loading. Both R and S are combinations of several statistical variables. Equation 1 says that failure occurs when S exceeds R, but this is really only failure of the PES. Real failure (of the system in Fig. 1 ) occurs when the SES cannot bear the consequences. To underline this point, we denote structural failure as "PES failure" in this paper. Traditional design, using Eq. 1, consists of ensuring a suitably low value of P F by increasing R. The typical engineering reaction to PES failure is therefore also to strengthen the resistance, the strength of the structures. This response to PES failure is called mitigation (fix it).
But provision of a "suitably low P F " is not always possible, because structure strength is often proscribed by social, economic, esthetic or other considerations. Some examples: Structures may need to be built so high that they block the view of the sea and cause public objections (esthetic consideration). Provision of a totally safe environment against the probability of direct hit by a hurricane, earthquake or tsunami will be too costly (economic consideration). People in far-away parts of the country do not want their tax money to provide a suitably low P F for a project in a far away location (social consideration).
If P F cannot be made low enough, we must learn to accept PES failure. This response to PES failure is called adaptation (live with it).
Adaptation involves the need to consider the consequences of PES failure. This means we must consider risk, which is defined as
where C is consequence of failure and (*) represents some combination of P F and C. The usual, but not necessarily correct combination of the two is simple multiplication.
Equation 1 represents the design criterion to provide suitably low P F . Equation 2 presents a new design criterion -design for minimum risk.
Equation 2 has been successfully used in the field of design of structures, where P F and C refer to the same structure. But there are serious problems when Eq. 2 is applied to a system consisting of (PES + SES). First, P F and C are innately different; P F is by design; C is not by design, but develops by historical evolution (such as population expansion in vulnerable areas). A second problem with applying Eq. 2 to a system with an SES is that individuals in the system simply want to be safe; they want the lowest possible P F , but the collectives (the communities or governments within the system) want to design for minimum total cost (to them) -see Sec. 4 below. It will be seen that these contrasting expectations result in conflicting requirements that will produce totally different designs. In the end everyone must somehow agree and the contemporary decision making process is the tool to reach this level of agreement through the SES input into the design process (Fig. 2 ).
Minimum Cost
Because the collective (government or community) normally pays for both the protection (P F ) and the consequences (C) of any PES failure, the collective will normally insist on minimizing its cost, which is the sum of the risk it takes plus the costs of designing and building the PES 2 . This extension of Eq. 2 is shown schematically in Figs. 3 and 4. 
Figure 4 Minimum total cost when risk is high
The minimum cost in Fig. 3 occurs near P F = 2x10 -3 . This design P F , based on the collective's minimum cost criterion, may be higher than the individuals within the system are prepared to accept and this will result in difficult negotiations during the decision making 3 . Figure 4 shows the same schematic as Fig. 3 , but the costs of the consequences are very high, relative to the structural costs of the PES. Such is the case, for example, in the Netherlands, where much of the country consists of high density populations living metres below sea level. The minimum cost in Fig. 4 is at P F = 4x10 -5 . Here governments achieve minimum cost and individuals will be satisfied with the low P F value. Subsequent decisions concerning safety should be relatively easy and approvals should be relatively simple to obtain. Figure 4 also comes close to the traditional engineering solution in which it is assumed that safety must be provided at all cost.
Figures 3 and 4 are also representative of two common situations; Fig. 3 represents rural areas, while Fig. 4 represents urban areas. In most designs several distinct areas must be combined. If a region consists of a combination of urban and rural sections, a minimum total cost calculation for the combined area would result in a design P F for the rural sections that is higher than the design P F for the urban parts. Thus the rural areas would experience PES failure earlier than the urban areas. In other words, rural areas will be flooded before urban areas. This inevitable anti-social outcome of minimum cost calculations will obviously lead to very difficult negotiations in the decision making process. If the rural and urban areas interact physically, if for example they are both located in a common river basin, then permitting upstream rural areas to flood earlier than downstream urban areas will by itself decrease P F for the urban areas. Flooding of upstream rural areas is, therefore, even more beneficial than strict minimum cost calculations would indicate.
Conversely, a political decision to protect all areas to the same design P F value (equal protection for all people) would result in an increase in the value of P F for the urban areas (not acceptable to individual citizens) or a decrease in P F for the rural areas (expensive for the collective). A basic definition of resilience is the ability to recover from failure, but defining resilience properly and developing a methodology to achieve resilience in practice, with respect to particular projects is very difficult. Introduction of resilience will be discussed below, with an extensive example, but first we will look at some of the common causes of failure.
Some Design Concerns
The recent disasters show that events with a low design P F value do occur. Let us first examine P F , its meaning and some caveats. P F is a statistical quantity, which must be based on an adequate and appropriate database. In practice, however: − P F is normally based on extrapolation of a database of a century or so of relatively quiet weather 4 . These values are inappropriate for the present and future climates, which will experience higher wind speeds and more frequent storms. For this reason we can expect a greater frequency of PES failures in the future. − There are no adequate databases for extreme events, such as direct hits by powerful cyclones or by tsunamis. In the past, the design P F values for such extreme events have mostly been based on surrogate databases, for example, flooding by hurricane storm surge and waves is based on 100 yr river basin flood levels. This is simply wrong. − Synthesized data bases for such extreme events may be the only approach, but they contain high uncertainties. Using inappropriate P F values makes subsequent sophisticated risk analysis and minimum total cost calculations meaningless, of course. 4 This statistical oddity was known many years before concern about global warming arose. Effects of climate change are in addition to the point made here.
Apart from the above concerns about P F , there are three other serious concerns in connection with failure and the need for resilience. In this paper they are called: "Secondary" processes, infrastructure concerns and rampant real estate development.
"Secondary" processes include: − Land subsidence − Sea level rise − Effects of global warming (such as accelerated sea level rise and increase in frequency and intensity of storms). Such "secondary" processes have not been routinely taken into account in coastal design, since they were generally thought to be small. But they cause P F to increase with time, e.g. a design P F of 10 -4 may become P F =10 -2 with time. Since a return to the original P F is costly, maintenance and upgrading are often delayed, which causes the structures to be vulnerable.
There are three concerns directly associated with existing infrastructure: − Much infrastructure is approaching the end of its useful design life, − Much infrastructure was poorly designed and built, − Much infrastructure was built to nebulous or incorrect standards.
With respect to rampant and unsafe real estate development we distinguish between developing and developed countries. In developing countries: − Overcrowding pushes people toward relatively empty shore areas (often emptied by earlier disasters and therefore vulnerable by definition), − There is a large migration of people from rural areas to urban areas, which are often located on the flood-prone shores of rivers and estuaries. This results in overcrowded urban areas, often in the most flood-prone locations. − There is a push to develop tourism facilities, often too close to shore. In developed countries: − There is development push. The income of developers is directly related to the amount of real estate they open up. − Much of this development takes place in "empty" (flood-prone) areas such as wetlands. These areas are empty for good reason, but modern technology permits us to convert such areas into valuable real estate by filling or diking. − Such flood-prone areas are often developed unsafely with the support of the government agencies that should be enforcing safety standards. Government agencies see an opportunity to share the cost of providing protection with the eager developers and any new development expands the property tax base (government income).
Introducing Resilience
Introducing resilience is generally interpreted as designing a resilient PES; a PES that can recover from failure. Structures are designed so that they do not collapse but can be repaired and the ecosystem recovers from impacts resulting from such PES failure. But much additional resilience can be gained by designing resilience into the SES; by designing a resilient system (PES + SES).
The SES consists of the all stakeholders, the government, the public and the economy. In Sections 3 and 4 we observed that individuals have different interests from the governments and therefore we will think of them separately. We separate the SES into a government interface (government services, etc.) and the rest of the SES. This results in the resilient system shown in Fig. 5 .
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Figure 5 Ideal resilient system
We can identify three stages of resilience design. These are: − Stage 1: Design of a resilient PES. Designing a PES that does not collapse when stressed beyond its design conditions but continues to provide partial protection and can be repaired − Stage 2: Design of a resilient Government Interface. This concerns provision of government services in connection with PES failure. These include research and development, advance warning systems, regulation, zoning and permitting, communication and transportation networks, utilities such as electricity water and sewage, emergency provisions such as search and rescue, policing, evacuation, medical and hospital services, etc − Stage 3: Design of a resilient Base of Support. This includes transparent discussion with the public, individuals, interest groups and the economy, preparing them for PES failure and enlisting their co-operation. This is achieved only through extensive interaction between the proponents, the designers and the various stakeholder groups as shown in Fig. 2 . As mentioned earlier, resilience design is usually considered to be only the technical aspect (Stage 1). As an example: "For our purposes, resilience refers to the ability to withstand higher than designed water levels and overtopping without breaching" (USACE, 2008).
Stages 2 and 3 are very much more difficult and take much more time than Stage 1. That is possibly the reason why they are usually not attempted.
Example -Designing a Resilient New Orleans
The options and limitations for reconstruction of New Orleans will now be presented to demonstrate the challenges and opportunities presented by such a disaster.
The city of New Orleans 5 was founded by the French in 1718 as a precarious, settlement on a sand bar in the Mississippi delta. In the subsequent years the small settlement expanded into a port city and tourist destination of a million people. Some of the city's dense infrastructure is on the original somewhat higher ground (Le Vieux Carré), but much of the city was developed on much lower grounds that were wetlands at one time. Historically, the city has been flooded a number of times. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 is one recent storm that exacted 76 lives and US$ 500x10 9 in damage. A number of Flood Control Acts were legislated in response to these earlier instances of flooding and this had resulted in a complex combination of levees that was built over many years according to different contracts and by different contractors. This flood protection did not constitute a complete physical protection system when Katrina hit in 2005. For example, large sections of the protection were below their design elevations, weak sections occurred where one levee-building project ended and another began and many vertical walls were designed to substandard criteria (USACE, 2008; ASCE, 2007).
New Orleans is a textbook example of the design concerns expressed in Section 6. Design P F values that were based on incorrect databases. The three "secondary" processes: land subsidence, sea level rise and effects of global warming (accelerated sea level rise and increase in frequency and intensity of storms) all affected the area. The infrastructure concerns: old infrastructure, poorly designed and built to nebulous standards, also played a role. Finally, a real estate push, much of it with co-operation of the regulating government agencies, greatly expanded the city by filling in and diking wetlands, thus creating large areas of real estate that were vulnerable to disaster. The resulting destruction by Katrina was both very devastating and costly.
As with other areas that have experienced or are threatened by disaster it is clear that abandoning the New Orleans site after Katrina is not an option. People, business and industry simply want to return to their earlier lives as soon as possible and many want to set up again on the same flood-prone sites. In response to this natural push, many building permits were issued, restricting opportunities for appropriate planning, for developing really new layouts and for new zoning regulations. But New Orleans is a living city, not some theoretical vacuum. Its citizens and businesses want to return and want amenities like shelter, power and clean water. They want aid and relief as soon as possible and they want governments at all levels to cooperate and provide this for them. To provide some safety for the haphazard reconstruction, stop-gap measures were initiated to rebuild some of the existing protection works. This move further restricts originality and opportunity for optimum design.
To redesign New Orleans, a minimum cost analysis should be done to determine design P F values. This is no easy task. A synthetic database must be created first, from which a design P F can be determined (with considerable uncertainty). Then, the consequences of flooding, which are notoriously difficult to determine with any accuracy must be calculated. It is likely, however, that such analysis would resemble Figs. 3 and 4 and produce a low value of design P F for the dense urban areas, while at the same time indicating that less densely populated and built up areas should be designed to a higher value of P F (should flood earlier).
The city has four options. Option 1 -Rebuild: This option is to rebuild the existing protection scheme, making all the necessary corrections and improvements to the designs with the benefit of the lessons learned from hindsight. This would be a gigantic project that would be very costly and would take a long time. In the end the reconstructed system would still be non-resilient (fragile, rigid and brittle). It would also not be capable of withstanding a hurricane of the magnitude of Katrina. This is not a good alternative.
Option 2 -Fort New Orleans: This design would be for a flood protection system that can withstand a direct hit by a Category 5 hurricane everywhere. This option is essentially the traditional engineering solution. It requires designing to much higher standards than were used for the existing, damaged flood protection. Such a design would be based on an uncertain (but appropriate) synthetic, computer generated database, since there are no historical data of direct hits on New Orleans by Category 5 hurricanes. In the end it is unlikely that this typical engineering solution would be affordable.
Option 3 -Minimum Cost: This option incorporates design P F values determined by a minimum cost analysis. The consequences of flooding the dense downtown areas of New Orleans are probably so high that a low design P F value (as in Fig. 4 ) will result. This would satisfy everyone in the densely built up and populated urban areas, but the flooding the surrounding areas, where the consequences of flooding are lower, would be very controversial. Particularly citizens in the same drainage basin who are not really part of metropolitan New Orleans will be difficult to convince that their homes should be flooded to provide maximum safety for the city.
Option 3 would need the construction of a resilient PES for New Orleansa PES that does not collapse suddenly, but can be repaired and rebuilt; where consequence of further flooding is minimized. That would most likely involve construction of large earthen primary dikes instead of vertical walls, and construction of secondary dikes to subdivide the flood prone areas into smaller sub-basins. Networks of interconnected drainage channels will be needed with sufficient pumping capacity to remove at least the rainfall generated by the design storm and with pumps that continue to function throughout the design storm.
The direct cost of Option 3 is much greater than for simply correcting and reconstructing the existing flood protection system as outlined in Option 1. But, in addition, provision of resilience involves large socio-economic costs: − Design and construction of Option 3 will take much more time (which the residents do not have) − The larger footprints of the wider, more resilient levees will reduce the available real estate area substantially (lowering the tax base). − The system of dikes and channels will severely impact communication and transportation networks. − The flooding of the less populous, outlying areas will cause tremendous disruption of normal life. Since the cost of structures built according to traditional (failure proof) design of Option 2 would be prohibitive, Option 3, representing Stage 1 design of resilience into the PES is the only sensible alternative to ineffective reconstruction of the damaged protection works in this vulnerable location.
Option 4 -System Design: Option 3, which amounts to resilient PES design (Stage 1 introduction of resilience) can be much enhanced by mobilizing additional resilience through engagement of the SES, thus designing a complete resilient system as in Option 4 will take years to develop and must be viewed as a final outcome of the design process. Redesigning New Orleans is clearly a formidable task that requires much ingenuity, courage, discussion, money and patience.
Conclusions
1. We must design complete coastal systems, consisting of PhysicoEnvironmental Subsystems (PES) supported by a Socio-Economic subsystem (SES). 2. The tool to ascertain SES support for a project is the cumbersome and complex contemporary decision making process, within which we must learn to work effectively and possibly take on a leading role.
